SAGT2014
The 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Accepted Papers

SAGT’14 accepted papers (in the order they were submitted)

 

  • Clearing Markets via Bundles. By Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier
     
  • Walrasian Equilibrium with Few Buyers. By Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz
     
  • The convergence time for selfish bin packing. By György Dósa and Leah Epstein
     
  • Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations. By Ioannis Caragiannis and Alexandros Voudouris
     
  • Short sequences of improvement moves lead to approximate equilibria in constraint satisfaction games. By Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli and Nick Gravin
     
  • Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Access. By Tobias Harks and Max Klimm
     
  • Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond. By Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Stiil Frederiksen and Jie Zhang
     
  • The complexity of approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a multi-player game in strategic form. By Kousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen and Troels Bjerre Sørensen
     
  • Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets. By Ahuva Mu'alem
     
  • Value of Targeting. By Kshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel and Sergei Vassilvitskii
  • Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes. By Shahar Dobzinski and Amir Ronen
  • Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics. By Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos and Milan Vojnovic
     
  • Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. By Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers
  • Paths to stable allocations. By Ágnes Cseh and Martin Skutella
     
  • Mechanisms for Hiring a Matroid Base without Money. By Emmanouil Pountourakis and Guido Schäfer
  • Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-sided Matching. By Qiang Zhang, Piotr Sankowski and Marek Adamczyk
  • Designing Matching Mechanisms under Constraints: An Approach from Discrete Convex Analysis. By Fuhito Kojima, Akihisa Tamura and Makoto Yokoo
     
  • Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities. By Elliot Anshelevich and John Postl
  • Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions. By Mukund Sundararajan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen
  • On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design. By Rafael Pass and Karn Seth
  • Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach. By Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski
  • Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold Models. By Dimitris Fotakis, Thodoris Lykouris, Evangelos Markakis and Svetlana Obraztsova
  • Stable marriage with general preferences. By Linda Farczadi, Jochen Koenemann and Konstantinos Georgiou
  • Self-stabilizing uncoupled dynamics. By Aaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira and Rebecca N. Wright
  • Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions. By Maximilian Drees, Sören Riechers and Alexander Skopalik
  • Approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games. By Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis and Marcin Jurdzinski

 

Additional brief announcements:

  • The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games. By Guillaume Sagnol, Ralf Börndorfer, Schlechte Thomas and Elmar Swarat
  • Multilevel Network Games. By Sebastian Abshoff, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung and Alexander Skopalik
  • Complexity of Optimal Lobbying in Threshold Aggregation. By Ilan Nehama