SAGT2014
The 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Program

 

 

 

SAGT 2014 Program

Location: CTI-Patras,Greece

 

Monday, September 29

18:30 – 20:30Banquet- Achaia Beach Hotel

 

Tuesday, September 30

 

09:50-10:10   Registration

10:10-10:15   Opening remarks: Dov Monderer

10:15-11:35   Session CS1: Matching Theory. Chair: Dov Monderer

  • Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond. By Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Stiil Frederiksen and Jie Zhang

  • Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-sided Matching. By Qiang Zhang, Piotr Sankowski and Marek Adamczyk

  • Designing Matching Mechanisms under Constraints: An Approach from Discrete Convex Analysis. By Fuhito Kojima, Akihisa Tamura and Makoto Yokoo

  • Stable marriage with general preferences. By Linda Farczadi, Jochen Koenemann and Konstantinos Georgiou

11:35-11:50   Break

11:50-12:20   Session Econ1. Chair: Ron Holzman

  • Dynamically Eliciting Unobservable Information. By Nicolas Lambert and Christopher Chambers

12:20-14:20    Lunch

14:20-15:20   Invited talk:  Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford. Chair: Nicolas Lambert

                       Identifying Central Individuals in Networks and Diffusion Processes

15:20-15:50   Break

15:50-16:50   Session CS2: Game Dynamics. Chair: Martin Hoefer

  • Short sequences of improvement moves lead to approximate equilibria in constraint satisfaction games. By Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli and Nick Gravin

  • Paths to stable allocations. By Ágnes Cseh and Martin Skutella

  • Self-stabilizing uncoupled dynamics. By Aaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira and Rebecca N. Wright

16:50-17:00   Break

17:00-17:30   Brief Announcements. Chair: Elliot Anshelevich

  • The Price of Spite in Spot-checking games. By Guillaume Sagnol, Ralf Börndorfer, Schlechte Thomas and Elmar Swarat

  • Multilevel Network Games. By Sebastian Abshoff, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung and Alexander Skopalik

 

Wednesday, October 1

 

09:00-09:30   Session Econ2. Chair: Paul Spirakis

  • Fair Flows. By Herve Moulin

09:30-09:40   Break

09:40-10:40   Session CS3: Games of Coordination. Chair: Sergei Vassilvitskii

  • Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities. By Elliot Anshelevich and John Postl

  • Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes. By Shahar Dobzinski and Amir Ronen

  • Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions. By Maximilian Drees, Sören Riechers and Alexander Skopalik

10:40-11:00   Break

11:00-12:00   Invited talk: Ron Holzman, Technion. Chair: Herve Moulin

                       Strong equilibrium in network congestion games

12:00-14;00   Lunch

14;00-15;00   Session CS4: Networks / Social Choice. Chair: Matt Jackson

  • Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold Models. By Dimitris Fotakis, Thodoris Lykouris, Evangelos Markakis and Svetlana Obraztsova

  • Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. By Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers

  • Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach. By Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski

15:00               Wine tasting in Patras + dinner (the dinner cost is included in the conference registration fee)

Thursday, October 2

 

09:30-10:30   Session CS5: Markets and Auctions. Chair: Inbal Talgam

  • Clearing Markets via Bundles. By Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier

  • Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Access. By Tobias Harks and Max Klimm

  • Value of Targeting. By Kshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel and Sergei Vassilvitskii

10:30-10:40   Break

10:40-11:20   Session CS6: Price of Anarchy. Chair: Piotr Faliszewski

  • Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations. By Ioannis Caragiannis and Alexandros Voudouris

  • Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics. By Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos and Milan Vojnovic

11:20-11:30   Break

11:30-12:10   Session CS7: Computational aspects of games. Chair: Tobias Harks

  • The complexity of approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a multi-player game in strategic form. By Kousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen and Troels Bjerre Sørensen

  • Approximate well-supported Nash equilibria in symmetric bimatrix games. By Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis and Marcin Jurdzinski

12:10-14;10   Lunch

14;10-15:10    Invited talk: Pavlos Spirakis, Liverpool. Chair: Troels Bjerre Sørensen

                         Potential Functions in Strategic Games

15;10-15:40   Break

15:40-17:00   Session CS8: Mechanism Design and Auctions. Chair: Ron Lavi

  • Monotonicity, Revenue Equivalence and Budgets. By Ahuva Mu'alem

  • Mechanisms for Hiring a Matroid Base without Money. By Emmanouil Pountourakis and Guido Schäfer

  • Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions. By Mukund Sundararajan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen

  • On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design. By Rafael Pass and Karn Seth